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This paper uses a unique micro data set to test for the presence of price
asymmetries at the firm level. We find that firm pricing is indeed asymmetric, as
Tobin (1972) suggested long ago. Moreover, there is strong evidence to support
Ball and Mankiw's (1994) suggestion that firm price asymmetry is dependent on
inflation. However, Ball and Mankiw's theory seems to hold better for changes in
costs than for changes in demand, a result which is consistent with the idea that firm
pricing is influenced by a desire to preserve customer relations (Okun, 1981) or by
information uncertainty (Dixit, 1976, Bhaduri and Falkinger, 1990). There is
pervasive evidence of asymmetry in response to changes in costs during high
inflation which tends to disappear during low inflation. There is no evidence of
asymmetry in response to demand shocks at high rates of inflation. However, there
is evidence that price changes are more responsive to demand decreases than to
demand increases and this is more notable during low inflation. Thus, the effect of
different rates of inflation on the demand asymmetry is broadly consistent with Ball
and Mankiw's hypothesis.
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Inflation and Asymmetric Price Adjustment"
I. Introduction
The nature of nominal price rigidity has a crucial influence on the real effects of
monetary policy and the characteristics of business cycles. Some economists have
argued that these price rigidities are likely to be asymmetric (for example Tobin,
1972) and some textbooks have captured this idea with a convex aggregate supply
curve (for instance Lipsey, 1983, Chapter 41). Evidence uncovered by Cover
(1988), and corroborated by De Long and Summers (1988), showing that in the
USA output has been more sensitive to negative money-supply shocks than to
positive money-supply shocks, has heightened interest in the idea of price
asymmetries. More recent empirical studies of the inflation effect of output gaps by
Laxton, Meredith and Rose (1995), Razzak (1995) and Tumer (1995), suggest that
price asymmetries may not be limited to the USA.
These empirical studies may have important implications for the validity of the
natural rate hypothesis and the role of demand management policies. However, it
is difficult to interpret what they imply about price setting behaviour by firms. They
are not clearly linked to any theoretical micro-foundation for price setting which
would explain price asymmetry and the precise form it should take. They use
aggregate data which may conceal the true nature of firm price setting behaviour.
Furthermore, they do not provide a direct test of price asymmetry. For instance, the
• We are grateful for excellent research assistance from Wonchang Jang and Dobromir 80jilov and to the NZ
Institute of Economic Research for providing the survey data. We thank laurence 8all. Simon Chapple, Paul
Caleott. Viv Hall, Vicki Plater and Hailong Qian for helpful comments on ear1ier drafts and participants at research
workshops held at Victoria University of Wellington, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the NZ Institute of
Economic Research and at a conference of the NZ Association of Economists at The University of Auckland.
Financial support was provided by a Reserve 8ank of New Zealand research grant
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relationships revealed by Cover and by DeLong and Summers may be due to
asymmetries elsewhere in the transmission of money to output. The same point can
be made about the empirical studies of the relationship between inflation and
aggregate output-gaps.
This paper makes use of a unique micro data set to test for price asymmetries at the
firm level. Two types of price asymmetry are evaluated. The first type is motivated
by Ball and Mankiw (1994). They consider a model in which firms make regularly
scheduled price changes and, by paying a menu cost, can also make special
adjustments in response to demand shocks. In their model, asymmetries in the
reponse of prices to shocks arise naturally when there is positive trend inflation and
are more pronounced at higher rates of inflation (the BM hypothesis).
The second type is motivated by considerations which may cause an asymmetry in
the way firms adjust prices in response to cost compared to demand shocks. While
it appears that menu costs of price adjustment may be a significant influence on
many firms' decisions to change price, the potential effect on customer relations and
the information costs required to deduce optimal price adjustments in an uncertain
environment may be more important influences on firm pricing decisions (see
Blinder, 1994). Either because of a concern for customer relations (Okun, 1981) or
because of information uncertainty (Dixit, 1976 and Bhaduri and Falkinger, 1990),
prices may be more sensitive to changes in costs than to changes in. demand (the
ODBF hypothesis)
The data used in this paper are ideally suited to evaluate these ideas. The data are
obtained from a survey of firms w~ich provide information about changes to their
selling prices, costs and demand. Furthermore, each firm's response to each
question can be identified. This means that we can match changes in a particular
firm's output price to the changes in costs and demand reported by that firm. Thus
we have an ideal data set to test the relative response of prices to changes in costs
and demand (a testof the OOBF hypothesis). It also means that we can easily
identify those firms that report increases and those that report decreases in prices,
costs and demand in order to compare the relative sensitivity of prices to increases
and decreases in costs and demand across different inflation environments (a test
of the BM hypothesis).
In the conclusion to their paper Ball and Mankiw comment that •An aspect of our
model that might be examined in future empirical work is the relation between price
adjustment and inflation" (p 261). This is one of-the objectives of this paper. A
second objective is motivated by the potential for firms to be concemed with their
customer relations and the presence of information costs to generate an asymmetry
in the way prices react to changes in costs compared to changes in demand. A
third objective is to evaluate whether the Ball and Mankiw price asymmetry, arising
from the interaction of menu costs and inflation, holds for both cost and demand
shocks.
The key empirical results to emerge from this paper are:
(i) Prices are typically more sensitive to changes in costs than to changes in
demand. This result is consistent with the OOSF hypothesis.
(ii) There is pervasive evidence of pricing asymmetry in response to changes in
costs which is systematically related to general inflation. At high rates of inflation
the coefficient on increased costs is significantly larger than the coefficient on
decreased costs. At low rates of inflation this difference between the cost
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coefficients tends to disappear. This is strongly supportive of the BM hypothesis
when applied to cost shocks.
(iii) There is evidence that price changes are more responsive to demand
decreases than to demand increases. This phenomenon is not captured by the Ball
and Mankiw model and, contrary to their hypothesis, there is no evidence of
asymmetry in response to demand shocks at high rates of inflation.
(iv) However, the demand asymmetry is more notable at low rates of inflation.
Thus, the effect of different rates of inflation on the demand asymmetry is broadly
consistent with the 8M hypothesis.
These results suggest that a model of pricing behaviour that captures both types of
asymmetry, Le., the differential response of prices to cost and demand shocks and
the variation in the response of prices to shocks across inflation regimes, would be
a more appropriate representation of the pricing behaviour of firms analysed in this.
paper. The implications for the aggregate inflation and output-gap relationship is
outside the scope of this paper, but the results presented here suggest that the
relationship may be more complex than is implied by the earlier cited aggregate
studies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes in more
detail the theoretical ideas motivating the potential for price asymmetry, drawing out
the distinction between asymmetry emerging from the interaction of menu costs and
inflation and illustrating how this asymmetry might be modified to capture other
adjustment costs which may cause asymmetry in the reaction of prices to cost and
demand shocks. Section III explains the type and source of the survey data used to
empirically evaluate these ideas and also describes the different inflation regimes.
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The price change model used to test the various hypotheses was estimated by
ordered probit. Section IV describes the way we have arranged the survey data
and the estimation procedure. The estimation procedure is in two stages. We first
test the OOSF hypothesis by estimating the relative contribution to price changes of
changes in costs and demand. These results are discussed in Section IV.1. The
second stage is a test of Ball and Mankiw's inflation induced price asymmetry
hypothesis, but distinguishing between cost and demand shocks. These results are
discussed in Section IV.2. Section V presents concluding comments.
II. Explanations for Price Asymmetries
Some of the most well developed ideas providing microfoundations for nominal
price rigidities have followed the "menu cost" approach, as reflected in the
collection of papers in Sheshinski and Weiss (1993). A feature of this approach is
that if it is costly to change price, firms will delay changes until the private benefits
outweigh the private costs. If there is general inflation, a firm's real price will
automatically fall thereby possibly offsetting a need to lower its nominal price. In a
dynamic setting the properties of nominal price rigidities and the real effects of
nominal demand shocks will vary according to whether firms follow time-contingent
or state-contingent pricing rules (see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, Chapter 8, and
Romer, 1996, Chapter 6).
Ball and Mankiw (1994) use these ideas to argue that nominal price adjustments
are asymmetric. They consider a model which combines elements of time-
contingent pricing, where a firm adjusts prices on a regular time schedule, and
state-contingent pricing, where a firm has the option of changing prices whenever
6
economic circumstances warrant a change. If mid-way between regular price
changes shocks are large enough, the firm will pay a menu cost and make an
additional price change. This set-up enables Ball and Mankiw to avoid the
complications created by cumulative shocks over several periods and to
concentrate on whether or not a firm should change price in response to a single
shock1•
Formally let 9 be an exogenous shock to a firm's desired price in the absence of
any menu costs, rr the general rate of inflation, and C the menu cost of changing
price. In the Ball and Mankiw model, the firm will not change its nominal price
between regular changes if C> (rr /2 + 9)2 I that is if
(1 )
If 9 is above the upper bound, the firm will raise price and if 9 is below the lower
bound, the firm will lower price.
At zero inflation, the range is symmetric and bounded by ±..JC. The range becomes
asymmetric if the inflation rate rr is not zero. For a given distribution of shocks, the
larger is the inflation rate the more likely the firm is to make a price increase and the
less likely it is to make a price decrease. Ball and Mankiw therefore predict that
there will be greater asymmetry in price responses to shocks at higher rates of
inflation2.
1 Carlson and Buckle (1996) consider the time between price changes. whether up or down. when there are
idiosyncratic shocks in an environment of general inflation.
2 In this approach price asymmetry arises endogenously in contrast to the approach in Ball and Mankiw (1995)
where the distribution of exogenous relative price shocks is the cause of asymmetry in the relationship between
aggregate demand and the aggregate price level.
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Note also the role of menu costs. If C were zero, the interval for not changing price
becomes empty for any rate of inflation, and the firm will either lower or raise price,
but the inflation asymmetry still holds, even with zero menu costs. A higher 1r
implies a wider range of shocks will be associated with price increases than with
price decreases. If some firms do not change prices within an interval of time, such
as a quarter of a year, then the implication of this model is that menu costs are non-
zero. Thus a sizeable fraction of firms reporting no change in prices during periods
of high inflation indicates non-trivial menu costs.
The results of Blinder's (1994) interview survey show that for those firms that have
explicit costs of changing prices, lump sum or "menu costs" appear to be the
dominant form of adjustment cost His survey also shows that concem for customer
relations and information costs are perceived by a larger proportion of firms to be
even more important considerations in their decisions to change price. These
customer relation and information costs may create another type of asymmetry for
the following reasons.
Okun (1981) has argued that in order to maintain their stock of customers, firms will
be reluctant to make changes to prices that would be viewed as unfair. Since a
significant cost to changing price is the disruption of firm and customer relations,
pricing decisions should be perceived as "fair" by customers. In this context, Okun
argued that firms find it easier to justify price increases on the basis of cost
increases than on the basis of demand increases.
The asymmetric impact of cost and demand changes on a firm's optimal price can
also arise because a given parametric shift affects marginal cost and marginal
revenue differently. An increase in a firm's costs unambiguously increases
•
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marginal cost and the optimal price. But, as Dixit (1976) points out, a similar
increase in a firm's demand curve may increase or decrease optimal price
depending on the how the change in demand affects marginal revenue, which is
affected only indirectly.
Dixit's result implies that even in an environment where firms have complete
information, in the aggregate the price change in response to an increases in
demand could be of indeterminant sign since some firms may raise price while
others may decrease price. It also implies that the -mean size of a price change
in response to a rise in demand could be small in comparison to the mean price
response to a rise in firm costs of the same magnitude.
Bhaduri and Falkinger (1990) argue that the significance of the asymmetric impact
of cost and demand shifts is reinforced when firms have incomplete information,
especially if firms tend to have harder information about their cost conditions than
about their demand conditions. Cost conditions depend on the technological
relationship between variable inputs and outputs and the price of those inputs.
Information about the former is internal to the firm while the reliability of information
about the latter will depend on the market conditions and contractual relations in
factor markets. In contrast, information about demand conditions relevant for
determining a firm's optimal price depends on imponderable conditions external to
the firm. As a result firms tend to regard cost as 'hard' information and demand as
'soft' information.
The type of pricing rule that can emerge under these conditions is one in which
firms will tend to base their prices on cost information. Their reaction in response to
changed demand conditions is to adjust prices more gradually as they obtain more
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reliable information through observations accumulated over time. Accordingly,
Bhaduri and Falkinger predict that prices will react more strongly to changes in
costs than to changes in "demand. Similar ideas can be found in Gordon (1981)
and Blanchard (1983).
Concem for customer relations and the availability of more reliable information
about costs compared to demand may therefore generate an asymmetry in the way
prices react to changes in costs compared to the way they react to· changes in
demand. In particular, in an interval of time, firms are more likely to make price
changes in response to cost changes than in response to demand changes..
In the context of Ball and Mankiw's menu cost model, these ideas suggest that for
firms that are additionally concemed with their customer relations or that have more
reliable information about costs than about demand, the parameter C will be larger
for changes to demand than for changes to costs. The implications for prices can
be illustrated by Figure 1 which is drawn assuming a common symmetric
distribution of shocks to costs and demand, both with mean zero. With no general
inflation, Le. ~=O, the 'zone of no-price-change' is symmetrically distributed about
the mean zero. If C is larger for demand shocks than for cost shocks, (Cd> CC) the
zone of no-price-change is larger for demand shocks than for cost shocks.
The effect of inflation is also easily illustrated by Figure 1. As ~ increases above
zero, the zones of no-price-change drift to the left so that, for a given distribution of
shocks, there is a higher probability that a firm will raise its price. Inflation
generates a potential price asymmetry for both cost and demand shocks, but the
probability of a rise in price in response to a rise in costs remains greater than the
probability of a rise in price in response to a rise in demand. If Cd is sufficiently
to
large the probability of a rise in price in response to a rise in demand would remain
small thus effectively eliminating the inflation induced asymmetry for demand
shocks postulated by Ball and Mankiw.·
III Data and Inflation Regimes
111.1 The NZIER Business Survey
The data used to evaluate these pricing hypotheses are all categorical consisting of
trichotomous responses by New Zealand firms to a survey questionnaire. The
individual firm responses are collected by the Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion
(OSBO) which is managed by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research
(NZIER). The OSBO is similar in style to the 'Business Test' of the IFO Institute fur
Wirtschaftsforschung, Munich, and there are many other business surveys· of this
type around the world. Examples are surveys by the National Federation of
Independent Business, USA, the Confederation of British Industries, the European
Economic Commission, and the Australian Chamber of Commerce & Industry and
Westpac Banking Corporation, and there are others documented by Kohler (1995).
For most surveys of this type the aggregate proportions of firms reporting for
instance increased prices, unchanged prices, and decreased prices, are typically
the only data that are available. There are however important features of this New
Zealand survey which set it apart from most others. The NZIER stores the
responses to all questions from every respondent firm and, apart from gradual
attrition and increases in the sample in 1986:1 and in 1991 :4, the sample of firms
surveyed remains the same in each quarter, although not all firms respond in every
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quarter. The survey also asks firms about the change in their costs which many
other surveys do not. Previous studies that have exploited these features of this
survey data to examine firm price and output behaviour are Jackson and Yeo
(1988) and Buckle and Meads (1991).
These features have several important advantages from the point of view of this
study. Firm responses to the question about price change can be matched with
their responses to other questions about costs, demand, etc. Secondly, the idea
that the probability of a price rise and the probability of a price fall will vary
systematically with inflation can be readily analysed because we can distinguish
between firms that reported increased, decreased, or unchange prices, costs and
demand in each quarter. Thirdly, individual firm data provide many more
observations than would aggregate proportions data in each of the selected
inflation regimes, which have an average time span of just over 3 years.
The NZIER survey involves the distribution to business executives of a standard
questionnaire that identifies the firm, its principal activity, location and size, contains
a series of questions asking about the firm's operating environment, and a standard
question asking executives to report their perceptions of the actual change during
the immediate past three months and expected change in the next three months (by
reporting 'Up' or 'Same' or 'Down' or 'N/A') for several activity variables.
This paper utilises responses to the following questions which have been
unchanged throughout the entire sample period:
12
"What has been your experience during the past three months and what




"All new orders received"
"Do you consider the general. business situation in New Zealand will
improve, remain the same, or deteriorate during the next six months?"
Responses to the first three questions provide individual firm data on actual and
expected changes to selling prices, costs and demand which are crucial for testing
price responses to particular shocks and the presence of asymmetry. Responses to
the fourth question were used to examine whether price responses to changes in
costs and demand are conditioned by a firm's view of the business outlook.
This business outlook variable may be interpreted as capturing anyone of several
potential influences on firm pricing decisions. It may be interpreted as another
proxy for perceived demand. Another possible interpretation is that the perceived
permanence of cost and demand changes may be reflected in firms' views about
the general business situation. If firms believe that the general business situation
will improve, presumably they are more likely to raise price, in anticipation that other
firms will raise prices. than if they believe the general business situation will stay the
same or deteriorate. The principle of 'strategic complementarity' (Cooper and John,
1988) suggests that if firms view the business outlook optimistically, the opportunity
costs of raising prices in response to increases in costs or demand may be
perceived to be smaller than if the business outlook was not viewed optimistically.
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The possibility that menu costs, concern for customer relations and information
costs vary across firms warrants some degree of disaggregation by firm type. In this
paper we report the results from two broad categories of firms covered by this
survey: manufacturers and merchantsJ • The individual respondent data are
available for manufacturers in every quarter since 1963:3 and for merchants in
every quarter since 1974:3.
11I.2 New Zealand Inflation Regimes
New Zealand's annual rate of consumer price (CPI) inflation since 1963 is plotted,
at quarterly intervals, in Figure 2. Superimposed on Figure 2 are 10 inflation
regimes we selected. These regimes are described in more detail in Table 1. Also
shown on Figure 2 is the annual rate of underlying inflation which has been the
target of monetary policy since the inception of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Act 1989 (see Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1995, p5). Estimates of annual
underlying inflation are only available from 1989:4.
The 10 inflation regimes were selected on the basis of New Zealand's annual
inflation rate (measured by the percentage change in the price index for quarter (t)
compared to the index for quarter (t-4)) , the timing of the application of a wide-
spread set of price and wage controls from 1982 to 1984 (see Boston, 1984), the
timing of subsequent widespread market deregulation (see Bollard, 1994), and the
period during which the inflation rate was maintained within the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand's target range of ato 2 %.
3 The NZIER survey also covers service firms. However, the questionnaire does not include a suitable demand
variable. Analysis of price change by service firms using the reported change in "volume of services· as a proxy






Other features of these regimes worth noting:
• The first five regimes are, in general, periods when inflation was on a rising
trend, while during regimes 7, 8 and 9 inflation was or had recently been
falling.
During the first five regimes varying degrees of regulation applied to many
product and factor markets in New Zealand; regime 6 is the period when
extensive price, wage and interest rate controls and the crawling peg
exchange rate policy were in place; regimes 7 to 10 cover the period of
extensive market deregulation in New Zealand.
Of the three high inflation regimes 4, 5 and 7, regime 4 covers the commodity
price shocks and the first oil price shock of 1973, regime 5 covers the second
oil price shock of 1979, while regime 7 covers the period when the extensive
price, wage, interest rate and foreign exchange controls were removed.
During regimes 8, 9 and 10 the Reserve Bank was operating under the
auspices of the RBNZ Act 1989 which was introduced in December 1989
specifying price stability as the primary function of the Bank; during regime 8
CPI and underlying inflation were generally falling but remained above the
current target range of 0 to 2 %; during regime 9 both CPI and underlying
inflation fell and remained within the Bank's target range; in regime 10 both
measures of annual inflation steadily increased again to the point where CPI
inflation exceeded 2 percent during all but the first quarter while underlying
inflation exceeded the upper bound of the Reserve Bank's target range in all
of the last four quarters.
Although regimes 9 and 10 have some distinguishing features, they are both
historically low inflation regimes. Only during regime 1 was inflation ever as
low as occurred during the last two regimes. It will be of some interest to
compare the pricing behaviour of firms during regimes 9 and 10 (when price
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stability was the primary fundion of the Reserve Bank) with the pricing
behaviour during regime 1 (when the Reserve Bank was operating under
different guidelines specified by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1964).
I V Ordered Probit Analysis of Price Changes
Our samples consist of firms that report the direction of change ('Up'; 'Same', or
'Down') in their output prices, costs and demand4• The responses are coded as 1
for Up, 2 for Same, and 3 for Down. Occasionally there are missing responses or,
for some reason, a firm marks 4 for Not Applicable. All firms with responses other
than 1, 2 or 3 were dropped from our sample. We then rescaled the variables by
subtracting 2 from every observation and multiplying by -1 so that the variables
used in the estimation had the value +1 for Up, 0 for Same and -1 for Down.
The possible influence of strategic complementarities was represented by
responses to a question that reads "Do you consider that the general business
situation in New Zealand will improve, remain the same or deteriorate during the
next six months?". Any responses other than 1 ('Improve'), 2 ('Same') or 3
('Deteriorate') were recoded as a 2. Then 2 was subtracted from all responses
which were then multiplied by -1 to create another +1, 0, -1 variable for business
outlookS.
4 In this paper we report results only for the actual changes. The results for expected changes are very similar.
Reporting the analysis of expected changes here would clutter the presentation without adding any essential
information.
S As a precaution against the possibility of colfinearity between demand and business outlook, the price change
model was also estimated without the inclusion of the general business situation variable but this made no
significant difference to the estimated demand coefficient.
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To estimate the influence of cost changes, demand changes and business outlook
on price changes, we chose to use ordered probit regressions (see Carlson and
Dunkelburg; 1989, for an example of the application of the ordered probit procedure
to business survey data of the type analysed in this paper). The problem with
standard regression procedures, such as ordinary least squares, when dealing with
qualitative categories is that one has to assign an arbitrary quantitative value to
each category. Should a decrease in price be scaled as far below a same
response as an increase is above the same response? Or should "up" be given a
relatively higher or lower value? With ordered probit, this is not an issue. The idea
is to maximise the,likelihood of observing the actual pattem of responses in each
category without regard to its quantitative value.
Let xlj,X2j, ...xkj' be a vector of explanatory variables for firm j. Define
(2)
where Uj is a standard normal variable. If there are three different ordered
outcomes (up, same, down), ordered probit will estimate q,~, ...,bk plus two
parameters, kl and k2 , such that for the following probabilities
Pr(firm j reports up) =Pr (Yj > k1)
Pr(firm j reports same) =Pr (k1 > Yj > k2 )
Pr(firm j reports down) =Pr (Yj < k2 )
"the parameters chosen will maximise the likelihood of the observed sample over
j =1,2.... ,n firms.
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For the price change model estimated in this paper, the category in which Yj falls
indicates the predicted change in firm j s own selling price while the xkj's denote
the change to costs, demand and the business outlook.
The results of the ordered probit estimation are presented in Tables 2 and 3. They
contain two sets of results for each type of firm (manufacturers and merchants) in
each of the ten inflation regimes. The first set of results in the top panel of each
table show the estimates of the coefficients, bk and hence the contribution of
changes in costs, demand and the business outlook to changes in firms' selling
prices. The relative size of these coefficients pertain to the ODBF hypothesis.
There are two sets of information generated to test the inflation induced asymmetry
hypothesis. The first relevant information are the estimates of the parameters k1
and k2 which are shown in the last two columns in the top panel of each table.
These cut point parameters correspond respectively to the upper and lower bounds,
or zone of no-price change, given by expression (1) and illustrated in Figure 1. If
the costs of price adjustment were homogeneous k1 and k2 could be interpreted as
the boundary points for each firm in the economy, otherwise they can be interpreted
as the average zone of no-price-change boundary points of all firms.
If the Ball and Mankiw inflation induced price asymmetry proposition holds, the
estimates of k1 and k2 should vary with inflation. At high rates of inflation the
absolute value of k1 should be smaller than the absolute value of k2 • As inflation
falls the value of k1 should rise and the absolute value of k2 should fall so that the
interval between them shrinks. At low inflation the absolute values of k1 and k2
should be similar.
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The second set of information used to test the BM hypothesis is shown in the bottom
panel of each table. This panel shows price asymmetry in terms of the
. responsiveness to particular shocks, that is changes in costs, demand and the
business outlook. These panels again contain separate estimates of the cost,
demand and business outlook coefficients except that now a distinction is made
between increases and decreases in the cost, demand and business outlook
variables. This was achieved by first identifying firms that reported increased costs,
demand and business outlook and those that reported decreased costs, demand
and business outlook and then constructing new dummy variables. The bottom
panels of Tables 2 and 3 report the resulting coefficients in ordered probit
regressions of price changes on these dummy variables. The c, d and b variables
have been scaled so that +1 is up, 0 is same and -1 is down. For instance, the
variable "c up" is +1 if c is +1 and 0 otherwise. "C down" is -1 if c is -1 and 0
otherwise. The same interpretation applies to the variables constructed for demand
and business outlook.
IV.1 The Relative Contribution of Cost and Demand Shocks
The top panels of Tables 2 and 3 show the coefficients on changes in costs,
changes in demand and the business outlook estimated by ordered probit for each
inflation regime. The coefficients for changes in costs are the largest coefficients for
both firm categories in all inflation regimes. The demand coefficients are
nevertheless always significant for manufacturers and are significant for merchants
in all periods except regime 5. The business outlook is significant for manufacturers
in the most recent regimes 8, 9 and 10 but is not significant for merchants in any
regime. The ODBF hypothesis that prices will be more sensitive to changes in costs
than to changes in demand is strongly supported by these results.
r
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Several other features are apparent from these estimates. It would appear that one
of the effects of the price and wage freeze during regime 6 was to reduce the
sensitivity of prices to changes in costs, especially in manufacturing. A second
feature is the fall in the size of the cost coefficient for both firm categories after
regime 7. This coincides with the fall in New Zealand's trend inflation and might
therefore be explained by the effect Ball and Mankiw postulate a fall in trend
inflation will have on the .degree of price asymmetry. A third feature is the
suggestion of an increase in the size of the demand coefficients after regime 6
compared to the periods prior to regime 6, particularly for merchants. This begins
prior to the fall in trend inflation and coincides with the introduction of widespread
market deregulation which occured after mid-1984 (Le., after regime 6).
IV.2 Tests of Inflation Induced Asymmetry
So far, the estimates have assumed symmetry in the response of prices (p) to up
and down changes to costs (c), demand (d) and business outlook (b). We now
examine the possibility of asymmetry. Ball and Mankiw's proposition implies that,
for a given menu cost of changing prices, inflation will systematically alter the upper
and lower bounds of expression (1) which in tum changes a firm's response to
exogenous shocks to either costs or demand or business outlook. We are therefore
interested in knowing whether the upper and lower bounds for price change vary
with inflation and also whether asymmetry is evident in the response of prices to
changes in costs or demand or business outlook.
The estimates of k1 and k2 for each firm category, shown in the top panels of Tables
2 and 3, are consistent with the BM hypothesis. The value of k1 is much closer to
the absolute value of k2 during the lower inflation regimes 1, 2 and 3 (available for
..
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manufacturers only) 8, 9 and 10 than during the higher inflation regimes 4, 5 and 7.
Moreover, this tends to be due to higher values of kl and lower absolute values of
k2 during the lower infla!ion regimes. During the price and wage freeze of
regime 6, when inflation fell sharply from around 14 percent to around 3 percent,
the difference between the value of k1 and the absolute value of k2 falls well below
the corresponding differences in the preceding and subsequent higher inflation
regimes 5 and 7. There is a clear tendency for k1 and k2 to vary with inflation in a
way that is consistent with the BM asymmetry hypothesis.
Tuming now to the bottom panels of Tables 2 and 3, it is clear that there is
pervasive evidence of price asymmetry in response to changes in costs. Firms are
much more likely to raise prices when costs are higher than to lower prices when
costs are lower. An asterisk indicates a statistically significant asymmetry. Hence
an asterisk on a ·c up· coefficient means that it is significantly larger than the ·c
downacoefficient.
Moreover, there is evidently less price asymmetry in response to changes in costs
in recent periods of low inflation than in higher inflation regimes, although this
varies across firm categories. For merchants the asymmetry with regard to costs
disappears in the lowest inflation regimes 9 and 10 and in regime 6. For
manufacturers it disappears in regime 10. These results are consistent with the BM
hypothesis.
There is also some evidence of price asymmetry with regard to demand. For
manufacturers and merchants the coefficients on ad down" are typically larger than
those on ad up". This means that firms are somewhat more likely to lower price in
response to a decrease in demand than to raise price in response to an increase in
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demand. However, for manufacturers the only statistically significant difference
occurs in regimes 1, 2, 8 and 9 while for merchants the only statistical difference
occurs in regime 10.
Ball and Mankiw's model does not predict that price changes will be more
responsive to demand decreases than to demand increases when there is positive
trend inflation. During periods of high inflation, there is no evidence of asymmetric
price responses to demand changes. This is contrary to the BM hypothesis.
However, in a sense their hypothesis is supported in that when there is high
inflation firms are less likely to make price decreases when demand falls than they
are in low inflation periods.
There is no overall pattem of asymmetry in the business outlook variable.
V Conclusions
This paper uses a unique micro data set to test for the presence of price
asymmetries at the firm level. The results show that firm pricing is indeed
asymmetric, as Tobin (1972) long ago suggested. Moreover. there is strong
evidence to support Ball and Mankiw's (1994) suggestion that price asymmetry is
dependent on the prevailing general inflation rate.
However, Ball and Mankiw's theory seems to hold better for changes in costs than
for changes in demand. The explanation for this might be found in a desire for firms
to preserve customer relations (Okun, 1981) or because of information uncertainty
(Dixit, 1976, Bhaduri and Falkinger, 1990) which underpin the idea that prices are
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likely to be more sensitive to changes in costs than to changes in demand. The
results of Blinder's (1994) recent interview based survey of firm pricing behaviour
suggests that these types of costs to price adjustment may be more important than
the menu costs of price adjustment that are used by Ball and Mankiw to motivate
price asymmetry.
For both manufacturers and merchants prices are more sensitive to changes in
costs than to changes in demand across all inflation regimes. This result strongly
supports the ODSF asymmetry hypothesis.
Although the demand coefficients are always significant for manufacturers and are
significant for merchants in all but one regime, there is no evidence of asymmetry in
response to demand shocks at high rates of inflation. However, there is evidence
that price changes are more responsive to demand decreases than to demand
increases and this tends to be more notable during low inflation. Thus, the effect of
different rates of inflation on the demand asymmetry is broadly consistent with Ball
and Mankiw's hypothesis. It is also consistent with Okun's hypothesis since
reductions in prices in response to demand do not represent the same threat to
customer relations that increases in prices in response to demand represent.
Evidence in support of this implication of Okun's customer market theory of pricing
can be found in Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986).
Understanding firm pricing behaviour is an important ingredient to understanding
the relative impact that monetary policy and other shocks will have on output and
inflation. This paper is an empirical contribution toward our understanding of firm
pricing behaviour. The nature of price asymmetry revealed by the empirical results
.., ...
-~
presented in this paper suggest that pricing behaviour is more complex than is
implied by the aggregate studies of price asymmetry cited at the start of this paper.
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Table 1: Inflation Regimes
---
Regime Low Medium High Price
inflation inflation inflation controls
1. 1963:310 1966:4
(Surveys 10·23)
1 ·4 % inflation
2. 1967:110 1970:3
(Surveys 24 • 38)
3 • 7 % inflation
3- 1970:410 1974:2
(Surveys 39 • 53)
5 - 10 ". inftalion
4- 1974:310 1979:1
(Surveys 54 • 72)
--'0· 15 ". in1Iatian
S. 1979:210 1982:2
(Surveys 73 • 85)
10·15 %i1SalIcn
6- 1982:310 1984:2
(Surveys 86 • 93)
3 • 14 % IntIallon
7. 1984:310 1987:3
(Sutveys 94· 106)
10 • 15 ". infIa1lan
a 1987:410 1991:1
(Surveys 107· 120)
4 • 9 ".1nIIa1lon
9. 1991:210 1994:2
(SuMys 121 ·133)
o • 2 % inlIalIon
10. 1994:310 1996:1
(Surveys 134·140)
2 • 4 ". intIalion
Note: The inflation range denotes the range within which the annual rate of consumer price inflation
was maintained during that regime.
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Table 2: Ordered probit estimation of price changes by Manufacturers
Relative influence of changes in costs, demand, and the business outlook
Reg. Period n c d b k1 k2
1 63:3-66:4 2806 1.00·t .17- .06 1.22 -1.33
2 67:1-70:3 3577 .92-t .30- -.02 1.07 -1.31
3 70:4-74:2 3291 .96-t .15- -.04 1.04 -1.44
4 74:3-79:1 4062 .92-t .13- -.00 .51 -1.28
5 79:2-82:2 2510 .88-t .19- -.05 .24 -1.37
6 82:3-84:2 1433 .49-t .29- -.04 1.02 -1.29
7 84:3-87:3 2960 .71-t .26- .01 .43 -1.19
8 87:4-91 :1 3135 .S2-t .30- .or .87 -.84
9 91 :2-94:2 3375 .39"1' .20- .24- 1.17 -.76
10 94:3-96:1 1670 .so-t .18- .12- .98 -.90
Test·of inflation induced asymmetry
Regime cup cdown d up ddown b up b down
1 1.16- .66 .06 .32- .08 .05
2 1.07- .39 .16 .45- -.14 .12-
3 1.10- .21 .11 .18 -.14 .08-
4 1.23- -.12 .14 .11 .02 -.01
5 1.15- -.22 .17 .21 -.07 .03
6 .68- -.17 .22 .32 -.02 -.05
7 .96- .04 .23 .29 .15- -.05
....
S .71- .19 .11 .47- .15 .02
9 .57- .21 .07 .37- .19 .32
10 .58 .36 .09 .29 .10 .16
Notes: • significantly different from zero at 5% level.
t c coefficient is significantly larger than d coefficient at 5% level.
n =sample size; c =coefficient on cost change; d =coefficient on demand change;
b = coefficient on business outlook; k1 = cut 1: k2 = cut 2
.."J_
Table 3: Ordered probit estimation of price changes by Merchants
Relative influence of changes in costs, demand, and the business outlook
Regime Period n c d b k1 k2
4 74:3-79:1 1767 1.51-t .16- -.10 .43 -.96
5 79:2-82:2 1043 1.39-t .07 -.02 .21 -1.11
6 82:3-84:2 587 1.1S-t .16- .02 .90 -1.24
7 84:3-87:3 989 1.16-t .32- .03 .31 -.84
8 87:4-91 :1 1042 .82-t .24- .03 .86 -.68
9 91 :2-94:2 1311 .70-t .19- .10 1.01 -.77
10 94:3-96:1 566 .8rt .37- .09 1.17 -.71
Test of in'flation induced asymmetry
Regime cup cdown d up d down b up b down
4 1.65- .72 .09 .20 -.15 -.07
5 1.51- .73 .12 .05 -.09 .03
6 1.22 .79 .03 .29 .08 -.05
7 1.31- .72 .14 .48 .06 .01
8 .95- .54 .12 .32 -.05 .11
9 .76 .57 .09 .29 .06 .20
10 .96 .73 .16 .61- -.10 .33-
Notes: - significantly different from zero at 5% leveL
t c coefficient is significantly larger than d coefficient at 5% level.
n = sample size; c = coefficient on cost change; d = coefficient on demand change;
b = coefficient on business outlook; k1 =cut 1: k2 =cut 2
